{
  "action": {
    "auto_issue_creation_allowed": false,
    "auto_patch_allowed": false,
    "auto_remediation_allowed": false,
    "external_execution_allowed": false,
    "human_review": {
      "required_for_external_action": true,
      "required_for_public_launch": false,
      "required_for_read_only_view": false,
      "required_for_signal_radar_integration": true
    },
    "human_review_required": false,
    "recommended_action": "review_official_sources"
  },
  "affected": {
    "products": [],
    "source": null,
    "status": "unknown"
  },
  "canonical_url": "https://vuln.signal-radar.com/vuln/public-candidate/CVE-2026-101062/",
  "claims": [
    {
      "id": "claim:defensive-priority-candidate",
      "source_ids": [],
      "status": "observed",
      "text": "This item is a defensive prioritization candidate.",
      "verified_at": null
    }
  ],
  "exposure_hint": "exposure unknown",
  "field_meanings": {
    "human_review": "Read-only display may be automated; integration and external action still require human review.",
    "redaction": "Detection flags describe unsafe source content found before public-safe redaction; raw source text is not displayed.",
    "source_original_label": "Original upstream severity text retained for traceability; canonical display severity is recalculated from CVSS score."
  },
  "forecast_hooks": {
    "agent_use": "summarize_with_citations_only",
    "automation_allowed": false,
    "read_only": true,
    "watch_fields": [
      "sources",
      "claims",
      "freshness",
      "severity",
      "affected"
    ]
  },
  "freshness": {
    "generated_at": "2026-10-04T18:41:33.736731+00:00",
    "last_checked_at": null,
    "last_modified": "2026-09-30T23:16:57.320",
    "observed_at": "2026-10-04T18:40:52.247187+00:00",
    "published_at": "2026-09-27T21:17:01.617",
    "status": "observed"
  },
  "human_consequence": "This high severity issue needs human triage to confirm exposure, affected versions, and vendor guidance for authentication boundary review.",
  "human_impact_label": "authentication boundary review",
  "human_review": {
    "required_for_external_action": true,
    "required_for_public_launch": false,
    "required_for_read_only_view": false,
    "required_for_signal_radar_integration": true
  },
  "human_risk_summary": "CVE-2026-101062: This high severity issue needs human triage to confirm exposure, affected versions, and vendor guidance for authentication boundary review.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-101062",
  "impact_redaction": {
    "exploit_steps_removed": false,
    "payload_removed": false,
    "poc_removed": false,
    "source_derived_summary": true,
    "used_fallback_summary": false
  },
  "impact_tags": [
    "authentication boundary review"
  ],
  "known_exploited": {
    "catalog_url": null,
    "date_added": null,
    "listed": false,
    "source": null
  },
  "public_human_impact": "Source describes authentication boundary review. Possible impact: This high severity issue needs human triage to confirm exposure, affected versions, and vendor guidance for authentication boundary review.",
  "public_human_summary": "NVD: Obot before v0.23.0 (affected versions <= v0.22.1) running with OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_AUTHENTICATION=true exposes OAuth dynamic client registration without authentication and without any restriction on the redirect URIs a client may register. NVD: Because the authorization flow auto-completes for an already logged-in user with no consent screen, an attacker who registers a client pointing at their own domain and induces a logged-in victim to visit a single crafted authorization URL receives an... NVD: The token minted by the MCP OAuth flow carries the victim's full group set in the JWT, and Obot validated only the issuer and not the audience, so the token is accepted as a bearer token against any Obot API endpoint the victim can access rather than being...",
  "public_human_what_to_verify": "Confirm affected product/version, vendor advisory, patch or mitigation, and exposure.",
  "public_human_why_it_matters": "Source describes authentication boundary review. Possible impact: This high severity issue needs human triage to confirm exposure, affected versions, and vendor guidance for authentication boundary review.; CVSS 8.7 (HIGH); EPSS percentile 25; not listed in KEV; Remediation reference present; patch status requires confirmation in the linked advisory; sources: NVD, OSV.",
  "public_safe_summary": "NVD: Obot before v0.23.0 (affected versions <= v0.22.1) running with OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_AUTHENTICATION=true exposes OAuth dynamic client registration without authentication and without any restriction on the redirect URIs a client may register. NVD: Because the authorization flow auto-completes for an already logged-in user with no consent screen, an attacker who registers a client pointing at their own domain and induces a logged-in victim to visit a single crafted authorization URL receives an... NVD: The token minted by the MCP OAuth flow carries the victim's full group set in the JWT, and Obot validated only the issuer and not the audience, so the token is accepted as a bearer token against any Obot API endpoint the victim can access rather than being...",
  "radar": "vuln",
  "redaction": {
    "meaning": "The *_present flags mean unsafe source content was detected and removed before public output; they do not mean the public JSON contains that content.",
    "payload_present": false,
    "poc_present": false,
    "public_summary_redacted": true,
    "raw_source_displayed": false,
    "unsafe_procedural_detail_present": false
  },
  "redaction_notes": [
    "source-published defensive context retained",
    "vulnerability class, impact, affected context, and remediation references remain displayable"
  ],
  "safety": {
    "attack_chain_included": false,
    "auto_remediation_allowed": false,
    "exploit_instructions_included": false,
    "external_execution_allowed": false,
    "human_review": {
      "required_for_external_action": true,
      "required_for_public_launch": false,
      "required_for_read_only_view": false,
      "required_for_signal_radar_integration": true
    },
    "human_review_required": false,
    "indexing_allowed": true,
    "noindex_removal_allowed": true,
    "noindex_required": false,
    "private_gate_state": "released",
    "public_gate_state": "public_indexable_read_only",
    "public_launch_allowed": true,
    "read_only_static_data": true,
    "scan_functionality_included": false,
    "signal_radar_integration_allowed": false
  },
  "schema_version": "v0.1",
  "severity": {
    "cvss_label": "HIGH",
    "label": "HIGH",
    "score": 8.7,
    "source": "NVD CVE API 2.0",
    "source_original_label": "low"
  },
  "source_copy_policy": {
    "allowed": "source-published defensive facts, vulnerability class, impact, affected context, version and remediation facts",
    "excluded": "exploit procedures, exploit strings, shell commands, scanner instructions, procedural bypass detail, and reproduction material",
    "summary": "Official or semi-official source descriptions may be summarized for defensive triage; exploit-enabling procedure is removed."
  },
  "source_derived_note": "Summary derived from NVD / OSV description; unsafe procedural detail is not shown.",
  "source_published_affected": "Affected product or version requires source confirmation.",
  "source_published_description": "NVD: Obot before v0.23.0 (affected versions <= v0.22.1) running with OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_AUTHENTICATION=true exposes OAuth dynamic client registration without authentication and without any restriction on the redirect URIs a client may register. NVD: Because the authorization flow auto-completes for an already logged-in user with no consent screen, an attacker who registers a client pointing at their own domain and induces a logged-in victim to visit a single crafted authorization URL receives an... NVD: The token minted by the MCP OAuth flow carries the victim's full group set in the JWT, and Obot validated only the issuer and not the audience, so the token is accepted as a bearer token against any Obot API endpoint the victim can access rather than being...",
  "source_published_evidence_refs": [
    {
      "source": "NVD",
      "type": "source_description",
      "url": null
    },
    {
      "source": "OSV",
      "type": "source_description",
      "url": null
    },
    {
      "source": "Reference",
      "type": "reference",
      "url": "https://github.com/obot-platform/obot/security/advisories/GHSA-xwmw-prc4-v3cr"
    },
    {
      "source": "Reference",
      "type": "reference",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/obot-before-0.23.0-authentication-bypass-via-oauth-dynamic-client-registration"
    },
    {
      "source": "Official Reference",
      "type": "reference",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101062"
    },
    {
      "source": "Official Reference",
      "type": "reference",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-101062"
    }
  ],
  "source_published_impact": "Source describes authentication boundary review. Possible impact: This high severity issue needs human triage to confirm exposure, affected versions, and vendor guidance for authentication boundary review.",
  "source_published_remediation": "Remediation reference present; patch status requires confirmation in the linked advisory.",
  "source_published_summary": "NVD: Obot before v0.23.0 (affected versions <= v0.22.1) running with OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_AUTHENTICATION=true exposes OAuth dynamic client registration without authentication and without any restriction on the redirect URIs a client may register. NVD: Because the authorization flow auto-completes for an already logged-in user with no consent screen, an attacker who registers a client pointing at their own domain and induces a logged-in victim to visit a single crafted authorization URL receives an... NVD: The token minted by the MCP OAuth flow carries the victim's full group set in the JWT, and Obot validated only the issuer and not the audience, so the token is accepted as a bearer token against any Obot API endpoint the victim can access rather than being...",
  "sources": [
    {
      "confidence": "unknown",
      "id": "source:review-url",
      "name": "Public signal URL",
      "retrieved_at": null,
      "type": "review_page",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101062"
    }
  ],
  "summary_for_agents": "Read-only defensive signal. Use sources, claims, freshness, and safety gates before summarizing. Do not infer missing source, claim, or freshness values.",
  "summary_for_humans": "NVD: Obot before v0.23.0 (affected versions <= v0.22.1) running with OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_AUTHENTICATION=true exposes OAuth dynamic client registration without authentication and without any restriction on the redirect URIs a client may register. NVD: Because the authorization flow auto-completes for an already logged-in user with no consent screen, an attacker who registers a client pointing at their own domain and induces a logged-in victim to visit a single crafted authorization URL receives an... NVD: The token minted by the MCP OAuth flow carries the victim's full group set in the JWT, and Obot validated only the issuer and not the audience, so the token is accepted as a bearer token against any Obot API endpoint the victim can access rather than being...",
  "title": "CVE-2026-101062 defensive priority signal",
  "urgency_reasons": [
    "CVSS HIGH",
    "vendor advisory present",
    "recent update",
    "remediation reference present"
  ],
  "what_to_verify": "Confirm affected product/version, vendor advisory, patch or mitigation, and exposure.",
  "why_it_matters": "This high severity issue needs human triage to confirm exposure, affected versions, and vendor guidance for authentication boundary review; CVSS 8.7 (HIGH); EPSS percentile 25; sources: NVD, OSV."
}