# Remediation Handoff: CVE-2026-97529

## Summary

NVD: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Validate BSG request_len before reading vendor_cmd[] The FC BSG transport allocates job->request via memdup_user() using the exact user-supplied request_len. NVD: For FC_BSG_HST_VENDOR, fc_bsg_host_dispatch() only guarantees request_len covers msgcode and vendor_id; it does not account for the vendor_cmd[] flexible array. NVD: qla2xxx then reads the command selector vendor_cmd[0] and, in several sub-handlers, vendor_cmd[1]/[2] or structures overlaid on the vendor command area without verifying request_len.

## Why it matters

CVSS severity is UNKNOWN with score unknown. EPSS percentile is 0.08633. KEV status is not listed in KEV. Use this as a defensive priority handoff, not as an execution instruction.

## Affected context

* Vendor: unknown
* Product: Kernel
* Component: unknown
* Version / CPE / PURL: unknown

## Remediation context

* Recommended route: vendor_patch_or_mitigation
* Vendor/advisory reference: official_reference_present
* Patch status: requires_confirmation
* Fixed version: unknown
* References: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97529, https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-97529

## Human checklist

* Confirm whether the listed product or package is present.
* Confirm affected version.
* Review vendor advisory or official source.
* Confirm patch, fixed version, mitigation, workaround, or monitor-only decision.
* Confirm exposure.
* Document remediation status.

## Safe AI / Codex handoff

* Goal: Prepare a defensive remediation plan for CVE-2026-97529 using only provided public-safe source context and any separate repo context supplied by the user.
* Allowed actions: summarize vendor guidance, prepare a defensive remediation plan, identify affected dependencies only when repo context is separately provided by the user, suggest tests and validation steps, document human verification questions
* Disallowed actions: generate offensive code, provide payloads, scan external targets, change production systems, merge or deploy changes, create GitHub issues or pull requests without explicit separate approval
* Acceptance criteria: Affected product or dependency presence is confirmed by a human., Affected version is confirmed or marked not applicable., Official advisory or source reference is reviewed., Patch, fixed version, mitigation, workaround, or monitor-only decision is documented., Validation steps are proposed without external scanning or production mutation.
* Human approval required: true

## Safety note

This handoff is for defensive triage and remediation planning only. It excludes offensive procedure, payload material, external target scan guidance, and auto-remediation.